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Abstract
In this paper, we summarize the development of the concept of emergence in physical
science and propose key concepts of emergence in the form of conjectures. Our
conjectures are threefold: I. A system having a broken-symmetry in membership relation
with respect to micro and macro scales can have emergent properties. II. Spontaneous
symmetry-breaking is an example of an emergent property. III. The phenomenon of
hysteresis accompanies spontaneous symmetry-breaking. We argue that these conjectures
and their relationship can illuminate the concept of emergence from the perspective of
symmetry breaking.
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1 Statement of the purpose
The purpose of this paper is to summarize the development of the concept of emergence in the
field of physical science, with a few original propositions from the authors. Where the new
propositions appear, we specify. During the review, we will formalize several propositions
(some old and some new) regarding the concept of emergence in a form of conjectures. At the
end, we restate three conjectures as the crucial propositions on the concept of emergence. Our
view is informed by experimental examples in physics and constitutes a further theoretical
study with respect to the New Emergentist Thesis advocated by Mainwood (2006). We begin
with a description of the concept of emergence.
2 Definition of the concept of emergence
A property of a system is said to be emergent if it is in some sense more than the sum of the
properties of the system’s parts. Emergence involves a process that exemplifies a higher-level,
global property in relation to lower-level, local properties. Framed in terms of parts and
wholes, one might say, along with Bar-Yam (1997), that "what parts of a system do together"
would not be done alone were it not for higher-level, global properties. Thus an emergent (or
higher-level, global) property, in our sense, makes a causal (and thus explanatory) difference to
the way lower-level, local properties interact and function together.
3 Brief history: recalling Anderson’s paper
Modern usage of the concept of emergence began among philosophers and can be traced back
to John Stuart Mill (1843) and George Henry Lewes (1875). The concept gained traction
among philosophers, the so-called British Emergentism, and eventually culminated in Charlie
Dunbar Broad’s (1925) seminal work, Mind and Its Place in Nature. However, in the field of
science, with the success of the reductionistic approach throughout the 20th century, the
emergentist view slowly retracted from the fields of physics, chemistry, and biology
(McLaughlin 1992). As Mainwood observes:
"The sciences of the very small (for example, high energy particle physics) would
be the one engaged in a search for fundamental laws, and other sciences could be
in a sense derivative, in that their subject matters are ultimately the behavior of
physical systems and this could be derived in theory from the laws and principles
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that governed the very small." (Mainwood 2006, 3-4)
However, a significant change took place in 1972 that put emergentism back on the
theoretical table, when Nobel Prize winning condensed matter physicist Philip Anderson
published a short paper, More is Different. Anderson advocated the foundational concepts of
emergentism in a pithy way as follows:
"At each level of complexity entirely new properties appear. . . At each stage
entirely new laws, concepts, and generalizations are necessary. . . Psychology is not
applied biology, nor is biology applied chemistry. We can now see that the whole
becomes not merely more, but very different from the sum of its parts." (Anderson
1972, 393)
Thus, Anderson’s important paper rekindled the discussion of emergence once again among
scientists, now summarized as the New Emergentist Thesis; and it is on these discussions that
we focus our attention here.
4 Categorization of emergence
We first give an overview of possible kinds of emergence, primarily following and modifying
the categorization of Christen et al. (2002). With exception of useful illustrations and analyses,
all citations in the categorization below are from the aforementioned work by Christen and
colleagues.
I. Epistemic Emergence: The phenomena appearing in the higher (upper) level is in
principle reducible to the properties of the lower level entities. "The reason for the
existence of a theory for the higher level is basically an instrumental one." (6)
II. Macroproperty Emergence/Laws Emergence: Some macroproperties (properties at the
macroscopic level)/laws "appear on a higher level because their applications need a
certain minimal degree of structure/organization." (7) In other words, these
properties/laws are in principle only possible at the higher level because they require a
certain minimal number of constituents interacting with each other. The interesting
question in this case is "whether such properties/laws have the same status like the ones
on the basic level." (7) We will assume for category II (unlike categories III and IV to
follow) that higher level properties/laws will not intervene in the actions of the lower level
entities. They are merely results of the large number of interacting constituents and do not
have any say on the actions of constituents.
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III. Weak Causal Emergence: Not only do there exist properties/laws at the higher level, it is
also the case that the higher level properties/laws affect the lower level entities causally
(downward-causation) in a way that the "possible causal space of the lower level parts
(the in principle possible actions the parts could cause given the properties/laws of the
lower level) is not violated" (7) In other words, the higher level properties/laws cause
certain actions of lower level properties in a way that the lower level properties/laws are
not violated.
For example, Nobel prize winning neuroscientist Roger Sperry became deeply dissatisfied
with the essential concepts of behaviorism and reductive materialism in the 1960s and
proposed a provocative emergentist alternative that sought to affirm our personal natures and to
reassign a causal role to conscious properties within an evolutionary framework: "Instead of
being excluded from science, subjective mental states, intrinsic to brains, are reconceived to be
indispensable for a full explanation of conscious behavior and its evolution, and are given
primacy in determining what a person is and does." (Sperry 1991, 222)1 However, what Sperry
means by downward causation is a bit puzzling in certain passages of his work. For one thing,
Sperry denies that the emergence of such properties could alter or supersede the laws that
govern the relations of lower-level components (see also Hasker 1999). Although Sperry
claims to be advancing a robust notion of emergentism, he nevertheless describes the
relationship between micro-properties and macro-properties as a relation of supervenience:
"From the start I have stressed consistently that the higher-level phenomena in
exerting downward control do not disrupt or intervene in the causal relations of the
lower-level component activity. Instead they supervene in a way that leaves the
micro interactions, per se, unaltered." (Sperry 1991, 230)
How can emergent conscious properties causally influence lower-level components if they
cannot "disrupt or intervene" in the causal relations of those components? If Hasker and Meehl
and Sellars are correct in asserting that the only way emergent properties can exert downward
causal influence is by altering the laws that govern the relations of the lower-level components,
then it might appear as though Sperry’s formulation of downward causation is incomplete
1For a fuller view of Sperry’s approach to consciousness, see Sperry, Roger. 1952.
"Neurology and the Mind-Brain Problem." American Scientist 40:291-312; Sperry, Roger.
1969. "A Modified Concept of Consciousness." Psychological Review 76:532-536; Sperry,
Roger. 1970. "An Objective Approach to Subjective Experience." Psychological Review 44:
585-90; Sperry, Roger. "Mind-Brain Interaction: Mentalism Yes, Dualism, No." Neuroscience
5:195-206.
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(Hasker 1999, 171-185)2 It seems clear that Sperry is committed to weak causal emergence
with respect to conscious properties. Sperry illustrates such a commitment with a clever
example involving the intermolecular relations of a rolling wheel:
"A molecule within the rolling wheel, for example, though retaining its usual
inter-molecular relations within the wheel, is at the same time, from the standpoint
of an outside observer, being carried through particular patterns in space and time
determined by the over-all properties of the wheel as a whole. There need be no
"reconfiguring" of molecules relative to each other within the wheel itself.
However, relative to the rest of the world the result is a major "reconfiguring of the
space-time trajectories of all components in the wheel’s infrastructure." (Sperry
1991, 223)
Despite its implicit advantages, there are nevertheless troubles that beset Sperry’s
commitment to weak emergent conscious properties (WECPs). For one thing, there is an
asymmetrical causal relation that holds between WECPs and base properties (BPs), such that
WECPs require BPs for their instantiation but BPs do not require WECPs for their causal work.
Elaborating the criticism more directly, even though Sperry’s rolling wheel analogue implies
that WECPs could reconfigure lower level neuronal events, the explanation he actually provides
(concerning the relationship between WECPs and BPs) ultimately entails the exclusion of
WECPs as a source of causation. One might suspect that the reason for such exclusion is that,
on Sperry’s account, the macro-level properties of the wheel, such as the property of going
down the hill, are fully "explicable in the reductionist style, in accordance with ‘bottom-up’
microdeterminism" (Hasker 1999, 182; see also Kim 2000, 2005). Given Sperry’s allegiance to
weak causal emergence, the lower-level BPs threaten to pre-empt any causal work that
higher-level WECPs could play in one’s overall behavioral life. Rather ironically, for Sperry,
consciousness turns out to be a fifth wheel with respect to behavior causation.
IV. Strong Causal Emergence: Now the higher level properties/laws change the possible
causal space of the parts of the lower level. Not only is it the case that the properties/laws
of the lower level alone cannot explain the action of the lower level entities, the
properties/laws of the higher level precede those of the lower level causally.
For example, consider the hypothesis of strong emergent conscious properties (SECP).
Under this hypothesis, SECPs are generated by the specialized activity of the
2See also Meehl, Paul and Wilfrid Sellars. 1956. "The Concept of Emergence." in
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 1: The Foundations of Science and the
Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, ed. Herbert Feigl et al., 239-52. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
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physical/biological properties, but are "not reducible to the physical-biological properties" in
part because they are capable of exerting a "downward" causal difference (Varela and
Thompson 2003, 273). In other words, the relation between consciousness and the brain is a
reciprocal causal relation, from bottom-up causation to downward causation. The idea of
reciprocal causal relations between the activity of neuronal assemblies and the activity of
consciousness is consistent with dynamical systems theory, in the sense that SECPs could play
a role of organizing, controlling, or constraining local neuronal activities (Varela and
Thompson 2003, 273-275; see also Freeman 2000). Similarly, Kelso argues that consciousness
"molds the metastable dynamic patterns of the brain" (1995, 288; see also Varela and
Thompson 2003, 273-275).
5 So where does current emergence theory stand?
We note that there exists a fundamental difference between category I and the rest, in that from
categories II to IV, there at least exist certain macroscopic phenomena which are impossible to
reduce to the properties of the lower level. One of the aims of this section is to properly
position the New Emergentist Thesis among the above categories. We will argue that the New
Emergentist Thesis is, at least, not an instance of category I. Among categories II to IV, the
difference comes from the status of the higher level properties/laws compared to those of the
lower level. We will further try to position the New Emergentist Thesis among these three
categories via Anderson’s approach to novel emergent properties.
Anderson (1972) motivates the novelty of emergent properties within a hierarchy of sciences,
according to the idea that the elementary entities of science X obey the laws of science Y.
X Y
Solid state/many-body physics Elementary particle physics
Chemistry Many-body physics
Molecular biology Chemistry
Cell biology Molecular biology
. .
. .
. .
Psychology Physiology
Social sciences Psychology
Then, Anderson goes on to state that "this hierarchy does not imply that science X is ‘just
applied’ science X".
6
"At each stage entirely new laws, concepts, and generalizations are necessary,
requiring inspiration and creativity to just as great a degree as in the previous one."
(393)
If a macro-level, systemic property, X, is truly novel, then X and its governing laws could be
regarded as exemplifying a reality status that is just as great as its micro-level properties and
laws. Mainwood makes the following useful remark in this context: "some systemic properties
are importantly novel: so different to the microphysical that they and the laws that govern them
can be recognized as having a metaphysical status in no way inferior to the microphysical." (20)
For example, there exists a fundamental broken-symmetry, in the sense that parts in level Y
are subsets of the whole system (at level X), but the whole system is not a subset of the parts in
level Y. We name such a property hierarchical realism after Christen et al. (2002). In what
follows, we conjoin hierarchical realism and novel emergent properties. To be clear, we first
formally define those notions as follows:
I. Hierarchical realism: The system under consideration has at least two hierarchical levels,
a higher level X where the system itself exists, and a lower level Y where the parts
making up that system exists. There exists a broken-symmetry between the two levels, in
the sense that the parts at Y are subsets of the whole system, but the whole system is not
the subset of the parts. In set theoretic notations, we can write as the following:
M = {m1, m2, m3, . . . , mn},
here, mn ∈M f or n = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n,
but M < mn.
Here ∈ denotes a membership relation, where M is at the level X, and mn are at the level
Y. We can call this property the broken-symmetry in membership relation.
II. Novelty of emergent properties: Some properties/laws at the system level are novel, and
different from those at the micro-level, such that they have the same reality status as the
micro-level properties/laws.
Following Anderson, we maintain that novel properties exist at the macro level. This claim is
at the heart the New Emergentist Thesis. Whether this claim is achievable will depend on its
testability. We may restate the claim as a form of conjecture:
Conjecture A (New Emergentist Thesis). A system realizing hierarchical realism
(having a broken-symmetry in membership relation) can have novel emergent
properties at the macro level.
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6 Novelty tests and their unsuitability
What are some possible methods for the novelty test and their unsuitability? Here we give two
examples, one with a theoretic problem and the other with an empirical problem.
I. Failure of inter-theoretic reduction: Consider, for example, Howard’s (2002) reflection
about a system with higher level B and in relation to the lower level:
"Inter-theoretic reduction is a logical relationship between theories. In the
classic formulation owing to Ernest Nagel, theory TB, assumed correctly to
describe or explain phenomena at level B, reduces to theory TA, assumed
correctly to describe or explain phenomena at level A, if and only if the
primitive terms in the vocabulary of TB are definable via the primitive terms of
TA and the postulates of TB are deductive.” (3-4)
This method is about the relationship between two descriptions at each level, A and B of
the same system; one description referring to microscopic properties of the system, the
other to macroscopic. The ambiguity here lies in that the reduction from TB to TA will
require some form of aids from the vocabulary of mathematics, and also in relation to the
amount of description we allow in TA. If we allow only the first-order logic as the
mathematical aid and also allow very little description in TA, then the method becomes
too strict. Not many theories can be reduced from B to A. If we allow usage of many tools
from mathematics as the aids in the reduction from TB to TA and allow vast vocabulary in
TA, it will be possible to represent the British emergentism as inter-theoretic reduction.
The problem of this method is that it is too general in its definition.
II. British emergentism: By contrast, C.D. Broad formulates an elegant definition of British
emergentism in the following:
"Put in abstract terms the emergent theory asserts that there are certain wholes,
composed (say) of constituents, A, B and C in a relation R to each other; that
all wholes composed of constituents of the same kind as A, B and C in
relations of the same kind as R have certain characteristic properties; that A, B
and C are capable of occurring in other kinds of complex where the relation is
not of the same kind as R; and that the characteristic properties of the whole
R(A;B;C) cannot, even in theory, be deduced from the most complete
knowledge of the properties of A, B and C in isolation or in other wholes
which are not of the form R(A;B;C)." (61)
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Broad also held that to derive the properties of a composite system from the properties of
its components, the following is required:
"(a) We need to know how the parts would behave separately. And (b) we need
to know the law or laws according to which the behaviour of the separate parts
is compounded when they are acting together in any proportion and
arrangement." (61)
The composite law in (b) can be either general or specific. If the law is universal in the
sense that it can be applied to many other systems (such as law of vector addition for two
vectors, which can be applied to any systems of vectors), it is called general. If the law is
specific in the sense that it applies to only a specific system, and the law covers unique
properties from that system, both the specific law and unique property are called
emergent.
This approach focuses on the relationship between the properties of two different systems:
one at the level of macroscopic scale (composite of the microscopic constituents), and the
other at the level of microscopic scale (the constituents themselves). The problem
surrounding Broad’s emergentism was an empirical one. At his time, no such specific
laws were known to systems.
However, we remain optimistic that Broad planted the theoretical seeds for an updated
version of British emergentism in the present. For one thing, Broad’s criteria for
emergence represent well the intuitions of novelty and unexpectedness in current science.
Broad recognizes that the properties of a composite system are always new in some sense.
And as the lack of empirical data was the sole reason Broad’s criteria were set on the
theoretical sidelines, we now give examples of symmetry-breaking and phase transition,
which have been extensively studied experimentally and theoretically for the past several
decades.
7 Possible examples for emergentism: I. ‘symmetry-breaking’ as a physical example of
novelty producing process
In what follows, we present an example of a novelty producing process well studied in the
physical sciences, that of ‘symmetry-breaking.’ After all, symmetry-breaking is the principal
example Anderson (1972) presented as the novelty producing process in his seminal paper:
"In my own field of many-body physics, we are, perhaps, closer to our
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fundamental, intensive underpinnings than in any other science in which nontrivial
complexities occur, and as a result we have begun to formulate a general theory of
just how this shift from quantitative to qualitative differentiation takes place. This
formulation, called the theory of ‘broken symmetry’, may be of help in making
more generally clear the breakdown of the constructionist converse of
reductionism." (393)
We focus on spontaneously broken symmetry (as opposed to explicitly broken symmetry,
where some symmetry-breaking term is explicitly added into the equations governing the
system: for example, consider an external magnetic term toward a particular spatial direction).
It is defined by Anderson (1984) in the following manner:
"Although the equations describing the state of a natural system are symmetric, the
state itself is not, because the symmetric state can become unstable towards the
formulation of special relationships among the atoms, molecules, or electrons it
consists of." (265)
Before we proceed to explain Anderson’s definition, it is important to state the principle of
minimum energy: for a closed system with constant external parameters and entropy, the
internal energy will decrease and the system will ultimately approach the state with a minimum
energy at equilibrium. This is a restatement of the second law of thermodynamics, stating that
in every real process the sum of the entropies of all participating bodies is increased. This
principle is an empirical finding accepted as an axiom of physics. The fact that this is an
axiom/law by itself without any derivation from other axiom/laws is important and will be
emphasized later.
Now we will explain the terms in Anderson’s definition. Let’s assume that in our physical
system of interest, that there exist governing equations which can describe the dynamics of the
system and describe the possible states the system can possibly be in (e.g., in physics such
governing equations for the system are often called Hamiltonian or Lagrangian of the system).
For example, if such governing Hamiltonian/Lagrangian does not show any preference of the
spatial orientation for the system to be in (e.g. the equation does not tell the system to align
toward top direction or bottom, or to point left or right, or toward you or against you), then the
equations have symmetry with respect to the spatial orientation, and are said to be symmetric
under the operation of translations. The system, indeed, can take advantage of such symmetry
and be in such a symmetric state.
In nature, we can observe the phenomena of ferromagnetism. For a ferromagnetic system (a
system with very many ferromagnets) at high temperature, each individual component making
up the system has random orientations like Figure 1 (a). Indeed, for such ferromagnetic
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(a) (b) 
Figure 1: Two systems of magnets expressed as an arrow are shown (the direction of the arrow
meaning from S to N of the magnet). (a) The state of the system above Curie temperature, in
which the magnets point to random directions. (b) The state of the system below Curie
temperature, in which the magnets point to one direction.
systems, the model equations we use to describe them have orientation symmetry. The
interaction terms in the equations do not have any preferences for the orientations. However, at
low temperatures, a novel phenomenon appears: the symmetry of the system suddenly breaks
down. Under a critical point called Curie temperature, there appears stable states with
individual components all aligned along a particular direction, as shown in Figure 1 (b). Now
the newly aligned states have the lower energy compared to the symmetric random state;
therefore, they become stable according to the principle of minimum energy, and the random
state with symmetry becomes an unstable state, for it has higher energy.
What we observed here is one example of phase transition. Such phase transitions can
happen not only in a system consisting of many magnets. It can also happen in a system with
many H2O molecules, He molecules, and super conducting materials, among many others. In a
system of H2O molecules, under the critical point of zero degree Celsius, the system now turns
into a crystal called ice, by aligning in a particular pattern of lattice-like configuration. Above
that temperature, the system gains symmetry (and becomes water) and the molecules freely
move without any alignment and configurations.
In summary, the symmetry of a large system can be very different from the symmetry of the
Hamiltonian of the system. The Hamiltonian, describing the interactions and motions of the
individual, does not tell what kind of symmetry the system will have. We needed another law to
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tell you that: the minimum energy principle. Thus, restating Anderson’s definition of
spontaneous broken symmetry, "although the equations describing the state of a natural system
are symmetric, the state itself is not, because the symmetric state can become unstable towards
the formulation of special relationships among the atoms, molecules, or electrons it consists
of." (265)
We summarize the traits of the spontaneous symmetry-breaking of a large system from the
critical phenomena of the phase transition:
I. The system must be made of a very large number of individual components.
II. In our example, the components were homogeneous (this happens to be an unnecessary
condition for phase transition: indeed, studies in physics tell us that much richer
phenomena at the macro level are possible if the components are inhomogeneous).
III. There is a critical point where the symmetry of the system begins to break.
IV. Beyond the critical point, the Hamiltonian that was able to describe the macro-properties
of the system loses its ability to describe.
V. We needed another law – especially the minimum energy principle – to describe the
macro-properties/laws of broken symmetries in the large system.
We emphasize that the law we required to explain the broken symmetry appears beyond the
critical point for the large system, which is the minimum energy principle. This is an axiom in
physics, inspired by empirical findings. By the definition of axiom, it does not require any
other laws to derive itself. In such manner, this exists independently from the microscopic
laws. We can state that the macroscopic property/law of broken symmetry relies on the
minimum energy principle that is not determined from the symmetries of the original
Hamiltonian (arising out of the microscopic interactions). Therefore, the third essential claim
of emergence, "novelty of emergent properties", that some properties/laws at the system level
be novel and have the same status as the micro-level properties/laws, is satisfied. There may be
cases that, upon close inspection, the microscopic interactions and laws that make up the
Hamiltonian also rely on the minimum energy principle. Still, in such a case, both the
macroscopic law and microscopic law will be at the level of status, and novel in the sense that
the descriptions from the minimum energy principle at each level are different from each other.
The direction or alignment of the system, under critical point, can be different from system A
to system B, even if their microscopic components are the same. For example, the
ferromagnets can align toward top, like Figure 1 (b), or bottom, depending on the ‘slightest
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difference’ in the initial arrangement of the magnets before they enter the Curie temperature.
The question is, can we predict the alignment of the system if all the microscopic laws and
information are known? We will return to this point later.
We summarize Anderson’s argument for the spontaneous symmetry breaking being the
example of emergence as the following conjecture:
Conjecture B (Anderson’s Thesis): Spontaneous symmetry-breaking is a novel
emergent property at the macro level, which cannot be explained from the
laws/properties at the micro level.
8 Possible examples for emergentism: II. can ‘hysteresis’ be another example?
We now focus on another phenomenon, hysteresis. Again, it is a phenomenon associated with
phase transition. In the broadest sense, hysteresis is a phenomenon where the current state of
the system depends on its past history. The most popular example is again of the magnets
(ferromagnetic materials), now in the presence of the external magnetic field.
For example, for a large ferromagnetic system made of many small magnets, consider the
case where the temperature is low enough such that the aligning of the magnets reduces the
energy, and such that in its natural circumstances the magnets are all aligned in one direction.
Now we can apply an external magnetic field to the aforementioned system. As shown in
Figure 2, when the external field is strong enough, all the magnets in the systems align in one
direction, following the direction of the external field (A and B in Figure 2). When we reverse
the direction of the magnetic field, the magnets in the system will now reverse its direction, and
if the field is strong enough, all magnets will be aligned towards the opposite direction. During
the process, the system itself acts as if it has inertia, and tends to stay where the system was at
its previous stage. The arrows in the Figure 2 show such a history dependent path of the
system. The dark area within the path is called hysteresis loop, and this area is the measure of
the hysteresis for the system. Because of such path dependency, the system can be in either
state C or D with exactly the same external magnetic field, temperature, pressure, etc.
The Phenomenon of hysteresis is another example of symmetry breaking. Here, the broken
symmetry is with respect to the time. Laws governing physical objects usually have symmetry
with respect to the direction of time, as we find in Newton’s law of motion describing the
trajectories of moving objects. For example, when one throws a ball into the sky and makes a
film of the trajectory, there is no way to know even if the film is projected in the time reversed
order: Newton’s law predicts that the motion of the ball going up is exactly opposite of the
13
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Figure 2: A system of magnets under external magnetic field exhibiting a hysteresis loop is
shown. At point A and B, the magnets are aligned in the direction of external magnetic field.
When the external magnetic field is changed, the system will either go through state C or D
depending on its previous state.
motion of the ball going down. So, if you project the film in the rewound fashion, it will be as
if it is shown in the original time direction.
That is not the case with the phenomenon of hysteresis. When one begins at point A in the
Figure 2, you must pass the upper path going through C to reach B. When one starts from B,
one must pass the lower path through D to comeback to A. If one films the action and projects
it, it will be immediately noticeable if the film is shown in reversed time direction.
Yuri Mnyukh argues from his paper (2013) that the phenomenon of hysteresis is a universal
feature (at least) in the phase transitions of condensed matters. Mnyukh argues that the
mechanism of phase transition is nucleation and propagation in most, if not all, cases, and it
inherently features hysteresis as one of its characteristics. If Mnyukh’s argument is correct,
then hysteresis (thus, time symmetry-breaking) would be a common feature of condensed
matter phase transition, including the spontaneous symmetry-breaking example given in
Section 7. We summarize Mnyukh’s argument as the following conjecture:
Conjecture C (Mnyukh’s Thesis): Hysteresis (time symmetry-breaking)
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accompanies all phase transitions, thus also the one caused by the spontaneous
symmetry-breaking.
If Mnyukh’s thesis is correct, then proving that the hysteresis is a novel emergent feature,
will be equivalent to proving that the spontaneous symmetry-breaking is a novel emergent
phenomenon. This is because the phenomenon of hysteresis always accompanies spontaneous
symmetry-breaking phase transitions.
9 Emergence and its relationship to symmetry-breaking: Curie’s principles
We begin this section by restating three conjectures:
Conjecture A (New Emergentist Thesis): A system realizing hierarchical realism
(having a broken-symmetry in membership relation) can have novel emergent
properties at the macro level.
Conjecture B (Anderson’s Thesis): Spontaneous symmetry-breaking is a novel
emergent property at the macro level, which cannot be explained from the
laws/properties at the micro level.
Conjecture C (Mnyukh’s Thesis): Hysteresis (time symmetry-breaking)
accompanies all phase transitions, thus also the one caused by the spontaneous
symmetry-breaking.
We point out that these conjectures are related to each other. Proving Conjecture B will
essentially prove Conjecture A – that there exist novel properties at the macro level. Proving
Conjecture C may make the task of proving Conjecture B easier: proof that hysteresis is a
novel emergent phenomenon is enough of a proof for Conjecture B.
These conjectures look at the problem of emergence from the perspective of symmetry
breaking. The New Emergentist Thesis essentially becomes the question of whether
symmetry-breaking in membership relation causes spontaneous symmetry-breaking (or time
symmetry-breaking) in the system at the macro level, which cannot be explained from any
other laws/properties at the micro level. Upon answering such questions, we may take hints
from principles stated by Pierre Curie, the very person who contributed to the study of systems
in Section 8 and Section 9, and came up with the concept of Curie Temperature. We recite
Curie’s principle of symmetry properties from Brading and Castellani (2005, 4):
1.1. When certain causes produce certain effects, the symmetry elements of the
causes must be found in their effects.
15
1.2. When certain effects show a certain dissymmetry, this dissymmetry must be
found in the causes which gave rise to them.
1.3. In practice, the converses of these two propositions are not true, i.e., the effects
can be more symmetric than their causes.
2. A phenomenon may exist in a medium having the same characteristic symmetry
or the symmetry of a subgroup of its characteristic symmetry. In other words,
certain elements of symmetry can coexist with certain phenomena, but they are not
necessary. What is necessary, is that certain elements of symmetry do not exist.
Dissymmetry is what creates the phenomenon.
Logically, 1.1 and 1.2 are the same, and 1.3 clarifies the statement. The effects may be more
symmetric than the cause, because the dissymmetry does not necessarily have to be transferred
from the cause to the effect. However, if there is a dissymmetry (broken-symmetry) in the
effect, there must be a dissymmetry in the cause. Essentially, the claim of New Emergentist
Thesis is that such cause of dissymmetry is not in the micro level laws/properties, but in the
macro level laws/properties, which originating in turn from the dissymmetry in the membership
relation between micro and macro. Do we have enough confidence about these conjectures
such that they can be considered an experimentally and/or theoretically proven thesis? We hope
to discuss this question in future works, also providing a clearer relationship between
broken-symmetry and emergence in the course.
10 Epilogue
There is a fundamental question about the novelty of emergence related to the very nature of
science. At its heart, science is crucially tied to an inductive mode of reasoning. Every theory
is based on natural observations, and the aim of every theory is to explain and predict the
natural observations. The validity of a theory is confirmed by experiments, and a theory is valid
only if the next experiment correctly confirms it so. As Karl Popper puts it, every scientific
theory should be falsifiable by the next experiment. There is Renormalization Group (RG)
Theory in the field of statistical physics which may explain some examples of critical
phenomena of phase transition. At the heart of the theory, there exists an iterative process
called renormalization by which we draw out macroscopic variables from the microscopic
ones. According to the theory, for the group of systems in the same category called universality
class, the microscopic details of the systems does not matter in drawing out the macroscopic
properties. It may very well be that the theory is self-consistent and without any loopholes,
such that we can prove the novelty at the macroscopic level and therefore the existence of
emergence with the theory. RG does not need to be a sole theory for such a task as explaining
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the mechanism for the emergence in question. We can construct many other theories, which
explain natural phenomena fittingly; and at the same time explains the mechanism for the
emergence under investigation. However, there is always a chance that the theory may be
falsified by our next experiment. We need theories to observe and explain the phenomena of
nature, and there is never a guarantee that any of those theories will be correct forever. In this
respect, the proof of novelty and claim of emergence is always epistemic (with the possibility of
being ontological). But by all practical means, in so far as our theory at hand is not wrong yet,
we can assume that the claim of emergence is ontological, at least given what we know today.
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